Since the early 1980s, governments worldwide have taken a wide range of policy measures to strengthen and expand market-based competition. So far, the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has not led to a significant policy reversal. Recent political events may well reflect widespread disenchantment with the consequences of neoliberal policies, but it remains to be seen whether the political leaders who rode to power by harnessing the discontent will deliver the market-restraining measures that many of their voters expect. This book highlights the role of "profiteers" in political efforts to…mehr
Since the early 1980s, governments worldwide have taken a wide range of policy measures to strengthen and expand market-based competition. So far, the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has not led to a significant policy reversal. Recent political events may well reflect widespread disenchantment with the consequences of neoliberal policies, but it remains to be seen whether the political leaders who rode to power by harnessing the discontent will deliver the market-restraining measures that many of their voters expect. This book highlights the role of "profiteers" in political efforts to expand market-based competition. Political struggles surrounding the gradual marketization of corporate control in Britain, Germany and France from the 1860s provide empirical illustration. The book maps and analyzes the path-dependent evolution of support for shareholder rights relating to takeover bids among key interest groups, including managers, creditors, shareholders, and takeover service providers, as well as among political parties. By comparing the self-reinforcing and self-undermining policy feedback of market-enabling and market-restraining rules, it helps explain why market containment is an uphill struggle, while market expansion becomes easier with time.
Helen Callaghan is a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. She studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford, obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and enjoyed a Max Weber Fellowship at the European University Institute before joining the MPIfG. Her research focuses on the politics of corporate governance in advanced industrialized economies. She has published peer reviewed articles in Comparative Political Studies, Comparative European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Political Economy, Socio-Economic Review, and West European Politics.
Inhaltsangabe
* Contents * Abbreviations * Acknowledgements * 1: Introduction * 1.1: The Puzzle: Market Liberalization Across Advanced Capitalist Democracies * 1.2: Analytic Focus: Policy Feedback Processes * 1.3: The Argument * 1.4: Research Operationalization * 1.5: Case Selection * 1.6: Epistemology, Ontology, and Method * 1.7: Outline * 2: The Political Dynamics of Marketizing Corporate Control * 2.1: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge * 2.2: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process * 2.3: Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control * 2.4: Economic Dynamism and Political Salience * 2.5: Summary * 3: Britain * 3.1: The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * 3.2: Turning Point after the Second World War: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 3.3: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules * Puzzle 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail? * 3.4: Summary * 4.: Germany * 4.1: The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * 4.2: Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 4.3: Summary * 5: France * 5.1: Prewar, Interwar and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * 5.2: First Turning Point After the Second World War: State Supervision of Incumbents * 5.3: Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps Toward Marketization * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 5.4: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules * 5.5: Summary * 6: Conclusion * 6.1: Findings * 6.2: Generalizability * 6.3: Alternative Explanations * 6.4: Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain * 6.5: Broader Theoretical Significance * Bibliography
* Contents * Abbreviations * Acknowledgements * 1: Introduction * 1.1: The Puzzle: Market Liberalization Across Advanced Capitalist Democracies * 1.2: Analytic Focus: Policy Feedback Processes * 1.3: The Argument * 1.4: Research Operationalization * 1.5: Case Selection * 1.6: Epistemology, Ontology, and Method * 1.7: Outline * 2: The Political Dynamics of Marketizing Corporate Control * 2.1: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge * 2.2: The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process * 2.3: Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control * 2.4: Economic Dynamism and Political Salience * 2.5: Summary * 3: Britain * 3.1: The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * 3.2: Turning Point after the Second World War: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 3.3: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules * Puzzle 3: Why did pro-market groups prevail? * 3.4: Summary * 4.: Germany * 4.1: The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * 4.2: Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 4.3: Summary * 5: France * 5.1: Prewar, Interwar and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids * Puzzle 1: What prevented market-enabling reforms? * 5.2: First Turning Point After the Second World War: State Supervision of Incumbents * 5.3: Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps Toward Marketization * Puzzle 2: Why did incumbents' defenses crumble? * 5.4: Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules * 5.5: Summary * 6: Conclusion * 6.1: Findings * 6.2: Generalizability * 6.3: Alternative Explanations * 6.4: Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain * 6.5: Broader Theoretical Significance * Bibliography
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