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Essay from the year 2018 in the subject Business economics - General, grade: A, University of Edinburgh (Edinburgh Law School), course: Corporation Law and Economics, language: English, abstract: This essay examines the question whether allowing directors to implement anti-takeover defences is beneficial for all corporate constituencies. Beginning with the classification of the topic in the law and economics context of the market for corporate control in Chapter 2, I will briefly outline in Chapter 3 the scenarios in which anti-takeover defences usually come into operation, namely hostile takeovers. Chapter 4 presents the most common anti-takeover defences and sets out the legal framework to what extent directors are permitted to adopt such defences in accordance with the applicable law. A distinction is made between UK and US law, with the latter focussing on Delaware law, where more than a half of all US publicly traded corporations are established. The Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court have developed an extraordinary body of jurisprudence concerning corporate takeovers and anti-takeover defences. Chapter 5 points out potential impacts on the various constituencies of a company and deals with the fact why their interests have to be regarded in the takeover context. Finally, Chapter 6 critically evaluates anti-takeover defences from different stakeholder perspectives and concludes that these are not beneficial for all corporate constituencies, but for directors only.