Johan A. Lybeck
A Global History of the Financial Crash of 2007-2010
Johan A. Lybeck
A Global History of the Financial Crash of 2007-2010
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This book presents a detailed yet non-technical analysis of the recent financial crisis.
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This book presents a detailed yet non-technical analysis of the recent financial crisis.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 416
- Erscheinungstermin: 28. Juni 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 750g
- ISBN-13: 9781107011496
- ISBN-10: 1107011493
- Artikelnr.: 34229621
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 416
- Erscheinungstermin: 28. Juni 2012
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 27mm
- Gewicht: 750g
- ISBN-13: 9781107011496
- ISBN-10: 1107011493
- Artikelnr.: 34229621
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Johan A. Lybeck has worked as Managing Director of Finanskonsult AB (Stockholm) and Risk Analysis SA (Brussels) for the last twenty-five years. As an academic, he has been, inter alia, a Chaired Professor of Economics, an Associate Professor of Econometrics and an Adjunct Professor of Finance. His banking career includes positions as Senior Vice President of Swedbank (Stockholm) in charge of financial strategy and Chief Economist at Matteus Bank. He holds a PhD in Economics (University of Michigan, 1971) and a 'fil. lic.' in Political Science (University of Gothenburg, 1986). He is also a captain and Chief Interrogator in the Swedish Air Force.
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Why you - yes, you! - should read this book
1. Introduction
2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia
Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010
3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts
4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis
5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world
Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization
Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9
6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929
Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS
7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency
Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9
Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'
8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences
9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis
Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States
Outstanding issues
References
Index.
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Why you - yes, you! - should read this book
1. Introduction
2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia
Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010
3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts
4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis
5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world
Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization
Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9
6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929
Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS
7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency
Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9
Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'
8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences
9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis
Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States
Outstanding issues
References
Index.
List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; Why you - yes, you! - should read this book; 1. Introduction; 2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia; Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010; 3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts; 4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis; 5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world; Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization; Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9; 6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929; Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS; 7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency; Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9; Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'; 8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences; 9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis; Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States; Outstanding issues; References; Index.
List of figures
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Why you - yes, you! - should read this book
1. Introduction
2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia
Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010
3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts
4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis
5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world
Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization
Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9
6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929
Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS
7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency
Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9
Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'
8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences
9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis
Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States
Outstanding issues
References
Index.
List of tables
Acknowledgements
Why you - yes, you! - should read this book
1. Introduction
2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia
Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010
3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts
4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis
5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world
Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization
Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9
6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929
Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS
7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency
Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9
Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'
8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences
9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis
Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States
Outstanding issues
References
Index.
List of figures; List of tables; Acknowledgements; Why you - yes, you! - should read this book; 1. Introduction; 2. Financial crises in the United States and Europe but not in Asia; Appendix 2.1. A chronological presentation of events January 2007-December 2010; 3. Could today's financial crisis have been foreseen? Some theory and some facts; 4. The American housing market and the subprime crisis; 5. Securitization and derivatives spread the crisis around the world; Appendix 5.1. Inherent conflicts of interest in subprime securitization; Appendix 5.2. Write-downs in individual banks, investment banks and insurance companies, 2007-9; 6. Liquidity risk aspects of the crisis and a comparison with 1907 and 1929; Appendix 6.1. The liquidity-risk framework proposed by the FSA and the BIS; 7. Credit risk aspects of the crisis, rating and solvency; Appendix 7.1. Government support activities for banks' capital ratios 2007-9; Appendix 7.2. The proposed new capital requirements under 'Basel III'; 8. Financial crises in modern history: similarities and differences; 9. Worldwide changes in regulation and supervision as a result of the crisis; Appendix 9.1. List of regulatory authorities in the United States; Outstanding issues; References; Index.
'A detailed and careful account of what happened and why in the global financial crisis. Full of facts and astute observations, this is an invaluable reference for anyone seeking to avoid a repeat of that awful experience.' Simon Johnson, MIT Sloan School of Management, and co-author of 13 Bankers (2010)