George Tsebelis

Changing the Rules

Constitutional Amendments in Democracies

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

George Tsebelis presents a theoretical argument and supporting empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between constitutional rigidity and the frequency and significance of amendments, as well as their variance. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 300
• Erscheinungstermin: 31. Mai 2025
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781009597265
• ISBN-10: 1009597264
• Artikelnr.: 72881900

Autorenporträt

George Tsebelis is the Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan where he works on political institutions. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has received honorary degrees from the Universities of Athens, Crete and Milan. He is the author (among other books) of Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (1991) and Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (2002).

Inhaltsangabe

Foreword
Introduction
1. The landscape of constitutional amendments
2. An institutional approach to constitutional rigidity
3. Cultural theories of constitutional amendments
4. Cases of failed amendments: Italy and Chile
5. A case of successful amendments: Mexico
6. Constitutional rigidity and amendment rate
7. Time inconsistency and other correlates of constitutional length
8. Constitutional rigidity and judicial independence
Conclusions
Bibliography
Appendices.