The concepts we use to value and prescribe (concepts like good, right, ought) are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?
The concepts we use to value and prescribe (concepts like good, right, ought) are historically contingent, and we could have found ourselves with others. But what does it mean to say that some concepts are better than others for purposes of action-guiding and deliberation? What is it to choose between different normative conceptual frameworks?
Matti Eklund is Chair Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University. He received his PhD from MIT in 2000. Previously he has taught at a number of other universities, including University of Colorado-Boulder and Cornell University. He has published on a variety of topics in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and metaethics.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Ardent Realism 2: Alternative Normative Concepts 3: Qualifications and Objections 4: Normative Concepts 5: Normative Properties 6: Presentationalism 7: Being Against What Is Plainly Right 8: Connections 9: Thick Concepts 10: Some Metaphilosophical Issues 11: Concluding Remarks
1: Ardent Realism 2: Alternative Normative Concepts 3: Qualifications and Objections 4: Normative Concepts 5: Normative Properties 6: Presentationalism 7: Being Against What Is Plainly Right 8: Connections 9: Thick Concepts 10: Some Metaphilosophical Issues 11: Concluding Remarks
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