Kenneth C Shadlen
Coalitions and Compliance
The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America
Kenneth C Shadlen
Coalitions and Compliance
The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents in Latin America
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This book offers systematic comparative analysis of the political economy of pharmaceutical patents in Latin America, and examines the diverse ways that international changes can reconfigure domestic politics.
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This book offers systematic comparative analysis of the political economy of pharmaceutical patents in Latin America, and examines the diverse ways that international changes can reconfigure domestic politics.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 312
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Oktober 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 152mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 635g
- ISBN-13: 9780199593903
- ISBN-10: 0199593906
- Artikelnr.: 48064337
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 312
- Erscheinungstermin: 17. Oktober 2017
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 152mm x 25mm
- Gewicht: 635g
- ISBN-13: 9780199593903
- ISBN-10: 0199593906
- Artikelnr.: 48064337
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Ken Shadlen is Professor of Development Studies in the Department of International Development, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His previous books include Democratization Without Representation (Penn State University, 2004), The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration (co-edited with Diego Sanchez-Ancochea; Palgrave, 2008), The Politics of Intellectual Property (co-edited with Sebastian Haunss; Edward Elgar, 2009), and Intellectual Property, Pharmaceuticals and Public Health (co-edited with Samira Guennif, Alenka Guzmán, and Narayanan Lalitha; Edward Elgar 2011).
* Part I: Context, Theory, Explanatory Framework
* 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses
* 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents
* Part II: Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents
* 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional
Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina
* 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico
* 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From
Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil
* Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems
* 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and
Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System
* 7: What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational
Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System
* 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance:
Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil
* Part IV: Conclusion
* 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy
* Fieldwork Appendix
* 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses
* 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents
* Part II: Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents
* 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional
Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina
* 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico
* 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From
Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil
* Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems
* 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and
Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System
* 7: What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational
Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System
* 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance:
Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil
* Part IV: Conclusion
* 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy
* Fieldwork Appendix
* Part I: Context, Theory, Explanatory Framework
* 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses
* 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents
* Part II: Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents
* 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional
Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina
* 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico
* 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From
Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil
* Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems
* 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and
Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System
* 7: What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational
Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System
* 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance:
Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil
* Part IV: Conclusion
* 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy
* Fieldwork Appendix
* 1: Global Change, Political Coalitions, and National Responses
* 2: The Political Economy of Pharmaceutical Patents
* Part II: Introducing Pharmaceutical Patents
* 3: Power to the Producers: Industrial Legacies, Coalitional
Expansion, and Minimalist Compliance in Argentina
* 4: Not If but How: NAFTA and Extreme Over-Compliance in Mexico
* 5: Coalitional Clash, Export Mobilization, and Executive Agency: From
Reluctant Acquiescence to Enthusiastic Over-Compliance in Brazil
* Part III: Modifying New Pharmaceutical Patent Systems
* 6: The Defensive Coalition on the Offensive: National Industry and
Argentina's Market-Preserving Patent System
* 7: What's Good for Us is Good for You: The Transnational
Pharmaceutical Sector and Mexico's Internationalist Patent System
* 8: Patent Policy in the Shadows of Over-Compliance:
Neo-Developmentalism in Brazil
* Part IV: Conclusion
* 9: Patents and Development in the New Global Economy
* Fieldwork Appendix







