Nabyla Daidj

Cooperation, Coopetition and Innovation

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

In presenting the concepts and the logical structure of the reasoning offered by game theory and their applications, the book explains the rational process of decision making in the framework of firm management and market competition. The book will expose both general teachings and a comprehensive analysis applied to specific case studies of various sectors of the economy.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley
• Seitenzahl: 272
• Erscheinungstermin: 10. Oktober 2017
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 160mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 590g
• ISBN-13: 9781786300775
• ISBN-10: 178630077X
• Artikelnr.: 45721824

Autorenporträt

Nabyla Daidj is a Lecturer and Researcher in strategic management at Telecom Business School (Télécom Ecole de Management) in France. She has published a number of books and articles in various journals (Leadership, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Media Economics and Journal of High Technology Management Research). Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI, Researcher (PhD), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction xi
Chapter 1. From Traditional Forms of Cooperation Toward New Collaborative
Practices 1
1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. What is cooperation? 1
1.2.1. The object of cooperation 1
1.2.2. The actors 2
1.2.3. Products and services involved 3
1.2.4. Agreement duration 4
1.3. The traditional forms of cooperation 6
1.3.1. "Traditional" cooperation at large 6
1.3.2. Exclusions from a restrictive typology 7
1.3.3. Typology of agreements by stage of production 14
1.4. New collaborative practices or the emergence of new innovation forms
21
1.4.1. Multiplication of "co-..." practices 21
1.4.2. Platforms 22
1.5. Conclusion 22
Chapter 2. Cooperation and Transaction Costs Theory 23
2.1. Introduction 23
2.2. The logics of transaction costs 23
2.2.1. Coase and the market costs 24
2.2.2. Developing the theory of transaction costs: Williamson 25
2.3. Alliance, market and hierarchy 29
2.3.1. The alliance, an intermediate form between market and hierarchy 29
2.3.2. The alliance, an alternative form to market and to hierarchy 33
2.4. Limitations of the contribution of transaction costs theory to the
analysis of strategic alliances 37
2.4.1. Issues associated with transaction costs 38
2.5. Conclusion 41
Chapter 3. Cooperation, Open Innovation and Property Rights 43
3.1. Introduction 43
3.2. The patents contest 44
3.2.1. Overall view: the notable growth of patents 44
3.2.2. Patents and innovation: the theoretical economic debate 47
3.3. Property rights and firms 49
3.3.1. Definition and fundamental features of property rights 50
3.3.2. A contractual conception of the firm 50
3.4. Property rights, technological externalities and inter-firm alliances
53
3.4.1. Property rights imperfections and externalities 53
3.4.2. Alliances and internalization of technological externalities 55
3.5. Property rights and open innovation 61
3.5.1. Open-innovation strategies 61
3.5.2. Intellectual property challenges in open-innovation practices 63
3.6. Conclusion 65
Chapter 4. Agency Theory and Strategic Alliances 67
4.1. Introduction 67
4.2. Cooperation and conflict in agency theory 67
4.2.1. Contract and firm 68
4.2.2. Agency theory and cooperation agreements 73
4.3. Agency theory, an analytical frame 80
4.3.1. An analytical frame for strategic alliances? 81
4.3.2. Strategic alliances: relations between "principals"? 83
4.4. Conclusion 86
Chapter 5. Strategic Alliances in R&D and Market Power 87
5.1. Introduction 87
5.2. Entry barriers and strategic commitment 88
5.2.1. Barriers and game theory 88
5.3. Alliances and strategic barriers to entry 92
5.3.1. Alliances as a means of erecting (or overcoming) barriers to entry
93
5.3.2. Alliances and strategic barriers to entry and R&D 93
5.4. Technological lifecycle, entry conditions and strategic alliances 95
5.4.1. Technological lifecycle and entry conditions 95
5.4.2. Technological lifecycle and strategic alliances 100
5.5. Strategic deterrent power to entry and technological race 102
5.5.1. Competition versus race? 102
5.5.2. The race for innovation 104
5.5.3. The introduction of cooperative phenomena between firms 106
5.6. Strategic dissuasion to entry, alliances and patent race 109
5.6.1. Innovation preemption by a market monopolist 109
5.6.2. Patent preemption, entry conditions and joint-ventures 110
5.7. Conclusion 112
Chapter 6. From Cooperation to Coopetition 113
6.1. Introduction 113
6.2. Origins of the concept of coopetition 114
6.3. The theoretical key factors of coopetition: borrowing from the theory
of games 115
6.4. From coopetition to inter-organizational networks 120
6.5. Coopetition and dyadic relations 123
6.6. Coopetition and technological platforms 124
6.7. Conclusion 126
Chapter 7. Theoretical Principles of Inter-firm Cooperation: RBV Approach
127
7.1. Introduction 127
7.2. Reversal of the "classic" paradigm of strategic management: strategic
management schools 127
7.3. Strategic intent 130
7.3.1. What is the connection with the theory of transaction costs? 130
7.3.2. A possible parallel with agency theory? 132
7.4. RBV extensions 132
7.4.1. KBV extension 133
7.4.2. Competencies 134
7.4.3. Dynamic capabilities 136
7.5. RBV approaches 138
7.5.1. First-mover advantage 138
7.5.2. Lasting competitive advantage versus temporary competitive advantage
139
7.6. Alliances and RBV 140
7.7. Conclusion 142
Chapter 8. Firm Multinationalization, Cooperation and Territorialized
Inter-organizational Networks 143
8.1. Introduction 143
8.2. The theoretical principles underlying internationalization dynamics
144
8.2.1. Various theoretical approaches 144
8.2.2. Arbitration between different methods of penetration in foreign
markets 149
8.3. Firm multinationalization and transaction costs theory 151
8.3.1. Application of transaction costs theory to equity joint-ventures:
Hennart's analysis 152
8.3.2. The introduction of time as a variable 153
8.4. Strategic alliances and eclectic theory of production 154
8.4.1. Eclectic paradigm: multiple advantage identification? 154
8.4.2. The real contribution of eclectic theory to inter-firm alliances 157
8.4.3. Further considerations of the OLI paradigm 158
8.4.4. Synthetic theory and strategic alliances 160
8.4.5. Comparative advantage, competitive advantage and international
cooperation agreements: the empirical analysis 162
8.5. Inter-firm international cooperation and territorialized networks 163
8.5.1. Comparative advantage, competitive advantage and "regional
advantage" 163
8.5.2. The expansion of localized industrial systems 164
8.5.3. Clusters and firm internationalization: which dynamics? 165
8.6. Conclusion 169
Chapter 9. Evolution of Strategic Alliances in the Context of Digital
Transformation 171
9.1. Introduction 171
9.2. Aerospatial sector 172
9.2.1. The specificities of the aerospatial sector 172
9.2.2. Supply structure and dynamics in the aerospace industry: numerous
alliances 174
9.3. E-health: towards a new ecosystem? 180
9.3.1. E-health: still an ambiguous concept? 181
9.3.2. E-health market: towards a greater number of actors involved? 182
9.3.3. The IoT (Internet of Things) market: data at the heart of the value
chain 183
9.3.4. The intensification of inter-firm collaborative practices in the
e-health ecosystem 184
9.4. Consoles and the video-gaming industry 188
9.4.1. A highly competitive oligopolic market 188
9.4.2. Numerous alliances between console manufacturers and video-game
publishers 192
Bibliography 197
Index 245