This book serves as a compact introduction to the economic analysis of law and organization. At the same time it covers a broad spectrum of issues. It is aimed at undergraduate economics students who are interested in law and organization, law students who want to know the economic basis for the law, and students in business and public policy schools who want to understand the economic approach to law and organization. The book covers such diverse topics as bankruptcy rules, corporate law, sports rules, the organization of Congress, federalism, intellectual property, crime, accident law, and…mehr
This book serves as a compact introduction to the economic analysis of law and organization. At the same time it covers a broad spectrum of issues. It is aimed at undergraduate economics students who are interested in law and organization, law students who want to know the economic basis for the law, and students in business and public policy schools who want to understand the economic approach to law and organization. The book covers such diverse topics as bankruptcy rules, corporate law, sports rules, the organization of Congress, federalism, intellectual property, crime, accident law, and insurance. Unlike other texts on the economic analysis of law, this text is not organized by legal categories but by economic theory. The purpose of the book is to develop economic intuition and theory to a sufficient degree so that one can apply the ideas to a variety of areas in law and organization.
Donald Wittman is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He previously taught at the University of Chicago. Professor Wittman's book The Myth of Democratic Failure (1995) won the American Political Science Association award for the best title in political economy in the years 1994-6. He is coeditor of the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Professor Wittman's research has appeared in journals such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, American Political Science Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Law and Economics, and Journal of Public Economics. His research has been supported by various National Science Foundation programs.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction Part I. Economic Fundamentals - Rationality and Efficiency: 2. Rational behavior, preferences and prices 3. Pareto optimally versus utilitarianism 4. Cost-benefit analysis Part II. Transaction Costs and the Coasean Revolution: 5. Transaction costs 6. Fencing in and fencing out 7. Coase versus Pigou Part III. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Law: 8. How to think like an economist: two hawks and a fence 9. Smoking regulations: market solutions 10. Rules of thumb: sports and driving rules Part IV. Rights: 11. The protection of entitlements 12. Property rights or communal rights in knowledge? 13. Liability for harm or restitution for benefit 14. Takings: should there be compensation for regulation Part V. Torts and Crimes: Liability Rules and Punishments: 15. Cost minimization and the role of liability rules 16. Negligence rules 17. Crime and criminal law Part VI. The Role of Sequence: 18. Mitigation of damages and last clear chance 19. The Good Samaritan rule 20. The role of being first in allocating entitlements Part VII. Contracts and Breach of Contract: 21. Default rules and breach of contract 22. When is a handshake a contract and when is a contract not a contract 23. Marriage as contract: family law Part VIII. Harms Arising Between Contracting Parties: 24. Exploding coke bottles 25. The role of asymmetric information 26. Consumers and producers cause damage: lawnmowers Part IX. Insurance and the Law: 27. The market for insurance 28. Royalties for artists and insurance for investors 29. Regulating automobile insurance 30. Bankruptcy 31. Deposit insurance and banking crises Part X. Governance and Organization: 32. The governance of organization 33. Corporate law and agency problems 34. Insider trading 35. Organizational response to opportunism 36. The organization of legislatures 37. Federalism 38. The internal organization of the family Part XI. Bargaining in the Shadow of a Trial: 39. Settlement of cases Table of cases.
1. Introduction Part I. Economic Fundamentals - Rationality and Efficiency: 2. Rational behavior, preferences and prices 3. Pareto optimally versus utilitarianism 4. Cost-benefit analysis Part II. Transaction Costs and the Coasean Revolution: 5. Transaction costs 6. Fencing in and fencing out 7. Coase versus Pigou Part III. Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Law: 8. How to think like an economist: two hawks and a fence 9. Smoking regulations: market solutions 10. Rules of thumb: sports and driving rules Part IV. Rights: 11. The protection of entitlements 12. Property rights or communal rights in knowledge? 13. Liability for harm or restitution for benefit 14. Takings: should there be compensation for regulation Part V. Torts and Crimes: Liability Rules and Punishments: 15. Cost minimization and the role of liability rules 16. Negligence rules 17. Crime and criminal law Part VI. The Role of Sequence: 18. Mitigation of damages and last clear chance 19. The Good Samaritan rule 20. The role of being first in allocating entitlements Part VII. Contracts and Breach of Contract: 21. Default rules and breach of contract 22. When is a handshake a contract and when is a contract not a contract 23. Marriage as contract: family law Part VIII. Harms Arising Between Contracting Parties: 24. Exploding coke bottles 25. The role of asymmetric information 26. Consumers and producers cause damage: lawnmowers Part IX. Insurance and the Law: 27. The market for insurance 28. Royalties for artists and insurance for investors 29. Regulating automobile insurance 30. Bankruptcy 31. Deposit insurance and banking crises Part X. Governance and Organization: 32. The governance of organization 33. Corporate law and agency problems 34. Insider trading 35. Organizational response to opportunism 36. The organization of legislatures 37. Federalism 38. The internal organization of the family Part XI. Bargaining in the Shadow of a Trial: 39. Settlement of cases Table of cases.
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