Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the…mehr
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate assertion? What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate action? With the tremendous but disparate growth of the literature on epistemic norms, the time is ripe for a volume bringing together papers by established and emerging figures, with an eye toward the interconnections among our three questions. That is precisely what this volume seeks to do.
Clayton Littlejohn is Lecturer in philosophy at King's College London. He specializes in epistemology and ethical theory. In his first book, Justification and the Truth-Connection (Cambridge University Press, 2012), he defended an account of justification that was both deontological and externalist. John Turri is Assistant Professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo (Canada). He specializes in epistemology, cognitive science and philosophy of language.
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * 1: Berit Brogaard: Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm * 2: E. J. Coffman: Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability * 3: Juan Comesaña and Matthew McGrath: Having False Reasons * 4: Jonathan Dancy: On Knowing One's Reason * 5: John Gibbons: Knowledge versus Truth * 6: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Epistemic Normativity * 7: Clayton Littlejohn: The Unity of Reason * 8: Duncan Pritchard: Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion * 9: Ernest Sosa: Epistemic Agency and Judgment * 10: John Turri: You Gotta Believe * 11: Matt Weiner: The Spectra of Epistemic Norms * 12: Daniel Whiting: Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action * 13: Sarah Wright: The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms * Index
* Introduction * 1: Berit Brogaard: Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm * 2: E. J. Coffman: Lenient Accounts of Warranted Assertability * 3: Juan Comesaña and Matthew McGrath: Having False Reasons * 4: Jonathan Dancy: On Knowing One's Reason * 5: John Gibbons: Knowledge versus Truth * 6: Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Epistemic Normativity * 7: Clayton Littlejohn: The Unity of Reason * 8: Duncan Pritchard: Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion * 9: Ernest Sosa: Epistemic Agency and Judgment * 10: John Turri: You Gotta Believe * 11: Matt Weiner: The Spectra of Epistemic Norms * 12: Daniel Whiting: Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action * 13: Sarah Wright: The Dual-Aspect Norms of Belief and Assertion: A Virtue Approach to Epistemic Norms * Index
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