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Inhaltsangabe
A / Ethics and Welfare Economics.- I. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking.- II. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.- III. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.- IV. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory.- V. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?.- B / Rational-Choice and Game Theoretical Models of Social Behavior.- VI. Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior.- VII. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories.- VIII. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts.- IX. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games.- X. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations.- XI. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations.- C / Scientific Explanation.- XII. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science.- XIII. Popper's Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses.
A / Ethics and Welfare Economics.- I. Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking.- II. Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.- III. Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives.- IV. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory.- V. Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economists Have a Special Exemption from Bayesian Rationality?.- B / Rational-Choice and Game Theoretical Models of Social Behavior.- VI. Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior.- VII. Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories.- VIII. Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts.- IX. Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games.- X. Measurement of Social Power in n-Person Reciprocal Power Situations.- XI. A Bargaining Model for Social Status in Informal Groups and Formal Organizations.- C / Scientific Explanation.- XII. Explanation and Comparative Dynamics in Social Science.- XIII. Popper's Improbability Criterion for the Choice of Scientific Hypotheses.
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