Nicolai Hartmann, Professor of Philosophy, University of Berlin, translated by Stanton Coit.
Volume 3: PART III THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL (THE METAPHYSIC
OF MORALS) Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS I. THE CONNECTIONS OF
THE PROBLEM II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM Section II
THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY PACE IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION V.
DETERMIN ISM AND INDETERMINISM VI. DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC VII.
ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM Section III THE ANTINOMY OF
THE OUGHT VIII. CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM X. THE'
PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY
AS PROOFS XI. PROOFS OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS XII. MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION XIII. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
XIV. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT XV. SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS XVI.
OUGHT AND THE WILL Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM
XVII. AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES XVIII. SOLUTION OF
THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY XIX. PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED Section VI APPENDIX TO THE
DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM CHAPTER XX. APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY
XXI. ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, INDEX.
