If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised, how are we to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? This work tackles such methodological or meta-theoretical issues, engendering rigorous debate.
If Raz and Dworkin disagree over how law should be characterised, how are we to go about adjudicating between the rival theories which they offer us? This work tackles such methodological or meta-theoretical issues, engendering rigorous debate.
Julie Dickson is a Fellow and Tutor in Law at Somerville College,Oxford.
Inhaltsangabe
1. What's the Point of Jurisprudence? 2. Introducing the Moral Evaluation Thesis 3. Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory: Meeting Finnis' Challenge 4. Finnis and the Moral Justification Thesis 5. The Beneficial Moral Consequences Thesis and an Introduction to Dworkinian Methodology 6. What's the Point of Law? Dworkinian Methodology and the Argument from Law's Function 7. Carrying on the Conversation
1. What's the Point of Jurisprudence? 2. Introducing the Moral Evaluation Thesis 3. Indirectly Evaluative Legal Theory: Meeting Finnis' Challenge 4. Finnis and the Moral Justification Thesis 5. The Beneficial Moral Consequences Thesis and an Introduction to Dworkinian Methodology 6. What's the Point of Law? Dworkinian Methodology and the Argument from Law's Function 7. Carrying on the Conversation
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