Evaluative Perception
Herausgeber: Bergqvist, Anna; Cowan, Robert
Evaluative Perception
Herausgeber: Bergqvist, Anna; Cowan, Robert
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Evaluation is ubiquitous. This volume brings together philosophers to investigate whether there is a distinctive kind of perception that is evaluative. If so, what role does it play in evaluative knowledge, and what does its existence tell us about the nature of value?
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Evaluation is ubiquitous. This volume brings together philosophers to investigate whether there is a distinctive kind of perception that is evaluative. If so, what role does it play in evaluative knowledge, and what does its existence tell us about the nature of value?
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 342
- Erscheinungstermin: 26. August 2018
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 680g
- ISBN-13: 9780198786054
- ISBN-10: 0198786050
- Artikelnr.: 50906791
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 342
- Erscheinungstermin: 26. August 2018
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 236mm x 155mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 680g
- ISBN-13: 9780198786054
- ISBN-10: 0198786050
- Artikelnr.: 50906791
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Anna Bergqvist is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University and Director of the Values-Based Practice Theory Network at St Catherine's College University of Oxford. Her principal research interests are aesthetics and moral philosophy. She is co-editor of Philosophy and Museums (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and has also published on aesthetic and moral particularism, narrative, thick evaluative concepts and selected issues in philosophy of language and mind. Robert Cowan is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. His research is focused on ethics, epistemology and the philosophy of mind. In particular he is interested in the nature and epistemology of intuition, perception, and emotion, as well as the connections between these and accounts of ethical knowledge.
* Introduction
* 1: Dustin Stokes: Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties
* 2: Heather Logue: Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?
* 3: Robert Audi: Moral Perception Defended
* 4: Paul Noordhof: Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent
Representation
* 5: Pekka Väyrynen: Doubts About Moral Perception
* 6: Mikael Pettersson: Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not?)
* 7: Anya Farennikova: Perception of Absence as Value-Driven Perception
* 8: Sarah McGrath: Moral Perception and Its Rivals
* 9: Jack C. Lyons: Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties
* 10: Michael Milona: On the Epistemological Significance of Value
Perception
* 11: Robert Cowan: Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic
Reason-Responsiveness
* 12: Graham Oddie: Value Perception, Properties and the Primary
Bearers of Value
* 13: Anna Bergqvist: Moral Perception, Thick Concepts and
Perspectivalism
* 14: James Lenman: The Primacy of the Passions
* 15: Kathleen Stock: Sexual Objectification, Objectifying Images, and
'Mind-Insensitive Seeing-As'
* 1: Dustin Stokes: Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties
* 2: Heather Logue: Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?
* 3: Robert Audi: Moral Perception Defended
* 4: Paul Noordhof: Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent
Representation
* 5: Pekka Väyrynen: Doubts About Moral Perception
* 6: Mikael Pettersson: Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not?)
* 7: Anya Farennikova: Perception of Absence as Value-Driven Perception
* 8: Sarah McGrath: Moral Perception and Its Rivals
* 9: Jack C. Lyons: Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties
* 10: Michael Milona: On the Epistemological Significance of Value
Perception
* 11: Robert Cowan: Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic
Reason-Responsiveness
* 12: Graham Oddie: Value Perception, Properties and the Primary
Bearers of Value
* 13: Anna Bergqvist: Moral Perception, Thick Concepts and
Perspectivalism
* 14: James Lenman: The Primacy of the Passions
* 15: Kathleen Stock: Sexual Objectification, Objectifying Images, and
'Mind-Insensitive Seeing-As'
* Introduction
* 1: Dustin Stokes: Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties
* 2: Heather Logue: Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?
* 3: Robert Audi: Moral Perception Defended
* 4: Paul Noordhof: Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent
Representation
* 5: Pekka Väyrynen: Doubts About Moral Perception
* 6: Mikael Pettersson: Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not?)
* 7: Anya Farennikova: Perception of Absence as Value-Driven Perception
* 8: Sarah McGrath: Moral Perception and Its Rivals
* 9: Jack C. Lyons: Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties
* 10: Michael Milona: On the Epistemological Significance of Value
Perception
* 11: Robert Cowan: Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic
Reason-Responsiveness
* 12: Graham Oddie: Value Perception, Properties and the Primary
Bearers of Value
* 13: Anna Bergqvist: Moral Perception, Thick Concepts and
Perspectivalism
* 14: James Lenman: The Primacy of the Passions
* 15: Kathleen Stock: Sexual Objectification, Objectifying Images, and
'Mind-Insensitive Seeing-As'
* 1: Dustin Stokes: Rich Perceptual Content and Aesthetic Properties
* 2: Heather Logue: Can We Visually Experience Aesthetic Properties?
* 3: Robert Audi: Moral Perception Defended
* 4: Paul Noordhof: Evaluative Perception as Response Dependent
Representation
* 5: Pekka Väyrynen: Doubts About Moral Perception
* 6: Mikael Pettersson: Seeing Depicted Space (Or Not?)
* 7: Anya Farennikova: Perception of Absence as Value-Driven Perception
* 8: Sarah McGrath: Moral Perception and Its Rivals
* 9: Jack C. Lyons: Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties
* 10: Michael Milona: On the Epistemological Significance of Value
Perception
* 11: Robert Cowan: Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic
Reason-Responsiveness
* 12: Graham Oddie: Value Perception, Properties and the Primary
Bearers of Value
* 13: Anna Bergqvist: Moral Perception, Thick Concepts and
Perspectivalism
* 14: James Lenman: The Primacy of the Passions
* 15: Kathleen Stock: Sexual Objectification, Objectifying Images, and
'Mind-Insensitive Seeing-As'