Jessica Brown is professor of philosophy in the Arché research centre at St Andrews University. Since her Ph.D. at Oxford University, she has worked on a wide range of topics within philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the methodology of philosophy. She has published a monograph) on self-knowledge (Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, MIT 2004), and has co-edited two volumes for Oxford University Press (Knowledge Ascriptions, 2012; Assertion, 2011). Since her appointment in St Andrews in 2007, she has helped to lead the highly successful international philosophical research centre Arché. She was principal investigator on a major AHRC-funded project (2008-12) examining the methodological foundations of philosophical enquiry. Since 2013, she has been the editor of Philosophical Quarterly.
1: Human fallibility and fallibilism about knowledge
2: The evidential commitments of infallibilism
3: Infallibilism and evidential support
4: The knowledge view of justification and excuse.
5: The knowledge view of justification and excuse.
6: Undermining defeat
7: Knowledge, chance, and practical reasoning
8: Conclusion