First Published in 2001. Morality is viewed as a demanding and unsympathetic taskmaster, and as an external, foreign, even alien force. The moral life, on such a view, is a labor not of love, but of duty. One of the guiding intuitions of this book is that this picture of morality is deeply and pervasively wrong. Morality is not an external or alien force and is not at all disconnected from the agent's values, or from her good. Indeed, what is morally required of an agent will/depend a great deal on, and will thus reflect, that agent's values, commitments, and relationships.
First Published in 2001. Morality is viewed as a demanding and unsympathetic taskmaster, and as an external, foreign, even alien force. The moral life, on such a view, is a labor not of love, but of duty. One of the guiding intuitions of this book is that this picture of morality is deeply and pervasively wrong. Morality is not an external or alien force and is not at all disconnected from the agent's values, or from her good. Indeed, what is morally required of an agent will/depend a great deal on, and will thus reflect, that agent's values, commitments, and relationships.
Troy A. Jollimore is Lecturer at the University of California, Davis.
Inhaltsangabe
List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction 1. The Objection from Friendship 2. Agent-neutrality, Agent-relativity, and Consequentialism 3. Friendship 4. Preview of the Argument Chapter 2: Consequentialism and Friendship 1. The Nature of the Objection 2. Friendships and Feelings 3. Differential Ability Consequentialism and Legitimate Values 5. Sophisticated Consequentialism 6. Friendship Without Partiality? 7. A Friend to Everyone? 8. Morality and Friendship Chapter 3: Morality and Its Limits 1. Introduction 2. Are Moral Considerations Overriding? 3. Worries About Morality 4. Is Morality Everything? 5. The Defense of Consequentialism Chapter 4: Agent-Neutrality 1. Consequentialism Without Maximization 2. Two Types of Non-Consequentialism 3. Is the Hybrid Theory Intuitively Plausible? 4. Restrictions and Integrity 5. Restrictions and Relativity 6. Three Objections from Scheffler 7. Relativity and Subjectivism Chapter 5: Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity 1, Introduction 2. Sen: Relativity of Permissibility 3. Nagel: Relativity of Reasons 4. McNaught and Rawling: Relativity of Principles 5. Moral Reasons, Moral Theories, and Moral Value Rankings Chapter 6: Agent-Relativity: The Moral Preferability Account: 1. Preferability and Relativity 2. Agent-Relative Reasons, Principles, and Properties 3. Agent-Relativistic Consequentialism 4. The Moral Agent and the Realm of Duty Bibliography Index
List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction 1. The Objection from Friendship 2. Agent-neutrality, Agent-relativity, and Consequentialism 3. Friendship 4. Preview of the Argument Chapter 2: Consequentialism and Friendship 1. The Nature of the Objection 2. Friendships and Feelings 3. Differential Ability Consequentialism and Legitimate Values 5. Sophisticated Consequentialism 6. Friendship Without Partiality? 7. A Friend to Everyone? 8. Morality and Friendship Chapter 3: Morality and Its Limits 1. Introduction 2. Are Moral Considerations Overriding? 3. Worries About Morality 4. Is Morality Everything? 5. The Defense of Consequentialism Chapter 4: Agent-Neutrality 1. Consequentialism Without Maximization 2. Two Types of Non-Consequentialism 3. Is the Hybrid Theory Intuitively Plausible? 4. Restrictions and Integrity 5. Restrictions and Relativity 6. Three Objections from Scheffler 7. Relativity and Subjectivism Chapter 5: Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity 1, Introduction 2. Sen: Relativity of Permissibility 3. Nagel: Relativity of Reasons 4. McNaught and Rawling: Relativity of Principles 5. Moral Reasons, Moral Theories, and Moral Value Rankings Chapter 6: Agent-Relativity: The Moral Preferability Account: 1. Preferability and Relativity 2. Agent-Relative Reasons, Principles, and Properties 3. Agent-Relativistic Consequentialism 4. The Moral Agent and the Realm of Duty Bibliography Index
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