Preface xvii Acknowledgments xxi I Introduction to the Theory of Games 1 Games of Strategy 3 2 Game Representations 19 II Solving Games 3 Dominated Strategies 41 4 Equilibrium 65 5 Mixed Strategies 85 6 Equilibrium in Nonmatrix Games 107 7 Equilibrium Selection 137 III Analyzing Sequential-Move Games 8 Subgame Perfection 161 9 Finitely Repeated Games 183 10 Infinitely Repeated Games 205 IV Incomplete Information 11 Simultaneous Games of Incomplete Information 225 12 Signaling: Sequential Games of Incomplete Information 245 13 Auctions 277 V Bargaining and Cooperative Game Theory 14 Non-cooperative Bargaining 307 15 Cooperative Bargaining 331 16 Cooperative Game Theory 347 17 Matching Market Design 371 VI Social Dilemmas 18 Social Dilemmas 397 19 Public Goods 411 20 Common Pool Resources 427 VII Social Choice and Voting 21 Social Choice 453 22 The Paradox of Voting 491 23 Voting with Private Information 511 VIII Behavioral Extensions of Standard Theory 24 Belief-Based Learning 533 25 Evolutionary Game Theory 545 26 Quantal Response Equilibrium 575 27 Level-k Reasoning 597 28 Psychological Game Theory 619 Appendix 645 References 661 Index 679
Preface xvii Acknowledgments xxi I Introduction to the Theory of Games 1 Games of Strategy 3 2 Game Representations 19 II Solving Games 3 Dominated Strategies 41 4 Equilibrium 65 5 Mixed Strategies 85 6 Equilibrium in Nonmatrix Games 107 7 Equilibrium Selection 137 III Analyzing Sequential-Move Games 8 Subgame Perfection 161 9 Finitely Repeated Games 183 10 Infinitely Repeated Games 205 IV Incomplete Information 11 Simultaneous Games of Incomplete Information 225 12 Signaling: Sequential Games of Incomplete Information 245 13 Auctions 277 V Bargaining and Cooperative Game Theory 14 Non-cooperative Bargaining 307 15 Cooperative Bargaining 331 16 Cooperative Game Theory 347 17 Matching Market Design 371 VI Social Dilemmas 18 Social Dilemmas 397 19 Public Goods 411 20 Common Pool Resources 427 VII Social Choice and Voting 21 Social Choice 453 22 The Paradox of Voting 491 23 Voting with Private Information 511 VIII Behavioral Extensions of Standard Theory 24 Belief-Based Learning 533 25 Evolutionary Game Theory 545 26 Quantal Response Equilibrium 575 27 Level-k Reasoning 597 28 Psychological Game Theory 619 Appendix 645 References 661 Index 679
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