Using archival materials from Gerald Ford's term, this book shows how the constitutional presidency reinforces even the politically weakest presidents under the separation of powers system. The constitutional presidency endures even when political circumstances may foreclose other informal personal powers of persuasion.
Using archival materials from Gerald Ford's term, this book shows how the constitutional presidency reinforces even the politically weakest presidents under the separation of powers system. The constitutional presidency endures even when political circumstances may foreclose other informal personal powers of persuasion.
Alex E. Hindman is visiting assistant professor of political science at the College of the Holy Cross.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Chapter 1: The National Nightmare is Over Chapter 2: The Constitutional Pillars of the Presidency Chapter 3: The Veto Power and the Power to Persuade Chapter 4: Commander-in-Chief and the Armed Forces Chapter 5: Spymaster-in-Chief and the Intelligence Community Chapter 6: Take Care Clause and Legislative Encroachments Chapter 7: Conclusion Appendices About the Author
Introduction Chapter 1: The National Nightmare is Over Chapter 2: The Constitutional Pillars of the Presidency Chapter 3: The Veto Power and the Power to Persuade Chapter 4: Commander-in-Chief and the Armed Forces Chapter 5: Spymaster-in-Chief and the Intelligence Community Chapter 6: Take Care Clause and Legislative Encroachments Chapter 7: Conclusion Appendices About the Author
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