Jay Odenbaugh

In a Sentimental Mood

Emotion, Evolution, and Expression

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Emotion, and its expression, is present in almost every facet of life: in our personal relationships, morality, politics, and art. Over time, emotions have evolved and have become intimately connected to our bodies, as matters of existential and scientific importance. In a Sentimental Mood is a philosophical examination of what emotion is, the kinds of emotions there are, and the ways in which they are expressed in our behavior and other social and moral expressions. Jay Odenbaugh's goal is to integrate the diverse work in psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and behavioural ecology with that from the philosophy of biology and psychology. This integration provides a unified, naturalistic understanding of this key component of human experience. Odenbaugh argues that emotion is a multimodal perceptual experience integrating exteroception and interoception. They are seamlessly about our environment, ourselves, and more specifically how we are faring in that environment. Many are natural kinds in virtue of being causally structured clusters of elicitors, behaviours, and autonomic nervous activities. Emotions are culturally widespread even with local inflections of place. Finally, Odenbaugh fruitfully integrates the nature of moral judgments with the resources of teleosemantics and hybrid expressivism. These judgments both describe and direct us to reciprocate, aid, and punish. Covering a wide range of research on human evolution and culture and bringing them into conversation, In a Sentimental Mood provides a bold new account of human emotional experience while also providing a useful synthesis of the state of the art on the topic.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Oxford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 304
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. Dezember 2025
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 201mm x 140mm x 30mm
• Gewicht: 408g
• ISBN-13: 9780197820438
• ISBN-10: 0197820433
• Artikelnr.: 75914669

Autorenporträt

Jay Odenbaugh is the James F. Miller Chair of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Calgary and specializes in the philosophy of science, philosophy of biology and environmental philosophy.

Inhaltsangabe

* Acknowledgments
* Introduction
* Chapter 1 What is Emotion? Emotion as Feeling or What James Got Right
* 1.1 Introduction
* 1.2. Theories of Emotion
* 1.2.1 William James and Bodily Feelings
* 1.2.2 Intentionality and Judgment
* 1.3 "Modified Jamesians"
* 1.4 Conclusion
* Chapter 2 Inside and Out: Emotions are Multisensory
Interoceptive/Exteroceptive Perceptions
* 2.1 Introduction
* 2.2 Representationalism
* 2.3 A Multisensory Perceptual Theory of Emotion
* 2.3.1 Preliminaries
* 2.3.2 Alternative Perceptual Theories
* 2.3.3 Emotions as Multisensory Perceptions
* 2.3.4 Emotions as Multisensory Exteroceptive and Interoceptive
Perceptions
* 2.3.5 The Theory of Constructed Emotion
* 2.4 Objections
* 2.5 Conclusion
* Chapter 3 Ties that Bind: Emotions are Natural Kinds
* 3.1 Introduction
* 3.2. Natural Kinds
* 3.3 Emotions and Affect Programs
* 3.3.1 Facial expressions
* 3.3.2 Autonomic changes
* 3.3.3 Elicitors
* 3.4 Barrett's critique - death by a thousand cuts
* 3.4.1 Weak Correlations
* 3.4.2 Ecological Validity
* 3.5 Griffith's Eliminativism
* Chapter 4 A Teleosemantic Account of Emotions and Their Functions
* 4.1 Introduction
* 4.2 Functions
* 4.3. Teleosemantics and Evolution
* 4.4 Disambiguating Questions
* 4.5 Conclusion
* Chapter 5 Cooperation, Commitment, or Culture: How Emotions May Have
Evolved
* 5.1 Introduction
* 5.2 Ledoux on Fear
* 5.3 Cosmides and Tooby on Emotion; Buss on Jealousy
* 5.4 Trivers on Reciprocal Altruism
* 5.5 Boyd, Richerson, Bowles, and Gintis on Cultural Group Selection
* 5.6 Frank on commitment devices
* 5.7 Emotions and their functions redux
* Chapter 6 Pressing Out: Emotional Expression as Designed Showing
* 6.1. Introduction
* 6.2 Darwin on Expression: Going the Whole Orang
* 6.3 What Exactly is Expression?
* 6.4 Expression as designed showing
* 6.5 Objections to Green's Account
* 6.5.1 Expression without self-expression
* 6.5.2 Expression, reporting, and showing-that
* 6.5.3 Self-expression and expressivism
* 6.6 Artifact Expression and Artworks
* 6.7 Conclusion
* Chapter 7 Wise Choices or Apt Feelings? A Hybrid Expressivist View of
Moral Judgment
* 7.1 Introduction
* 7.2 Sentimentalism
* 7.3. Philosophical Stage-Setting
* 7.4 Empirical Evidence
* 7.4.1 The Emotional Brain
* 7.4.2 Incidental Disgust
* 7.4.3 Moral Dumbfounding
* 7.4.4 Psychopathy
* 7.5 Emotion, the moral problem, and expressivism
* 7.6 Conclusion