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"Moral Practices "puts forward arguments against two prominent views in contemporary ethics. Firstly, it shows that moral practices cannot be explained in terms of individual decision. Secondly, it demonstrates that although moral conclusions follow from certain facts within a moral practice, the same facts need not lead to these conclusions when viewed from within different moral practices. The book explores the implications of recognizing the multiplicity of moral practices for such issues as ethical relativity, moral dilemmas and moral disagreement.
This is Volume VI of nine in a collection of studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Originally published in 1970, this volume looks at moral practices and the question which has puzzled philosophers: whether any value judgement can follow logically from the facts, can follow in such a way that someone who assents to the facts is bound in logic to assent also to the value judgement based upon them.
This is Volume VI of nine in a collection of studies in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion. Originally published in 1970, this volume looks at moral practices and the question which has puzzled philosophers: whether any value judgement can follow logically from the facts, can follow in such a way that someone who assents to the facts is bound in logic to assent also to the value judgement based upon them.