Robert Powell

Nuclear Deterrence Theory

The Search for Credibility

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 240
• Erscheinungstermin: 15. Februar 2005
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 240mm x 161mm x 18mm
• Gewicht: 529g
• ISBN-13: 9780521375276
• ISBN-10: 0521375274
• Artikelnr.: 21596525

Autorenporträt

Robert Powell has had a long career in social and market research. Robert spent many years in Canada before returning to Australia, and served as a national director for a number of international corporations prior to commencing his own market research business in 1990.In his professional career, Robert developed a particular interest in the impact of change on individuals, during the transitions between life stages and sought to provide a greater understanding of the sensitivities involved in what for many is a traumatic event.

Inhaltsangabe

Preface
1. Introduction
2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility
3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship
4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises
5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age
6. Stability and the lack of control
7. The strategy of limited retaliation
8. An appraisal
Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory
References
Index.