Herausgeber: Echenique, Federico (University of California; Vazirani, Vijay V. (University of California; Immorlica, Nicole (Microsoft Research New England)
Herausgeber: Echenique, Federico (University of California; Vazirani, Vijay V. (University of California; Immorlica, Nicole (Microsoft Research New England)
Written by more than fifty top researchers from economics, OR, and algorithm design, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications from the basics to state of the art. Key chapters discuss efficiency, fairness and incentives, and market design and its relation to social choice theory.
Written by more than fifty top researchers from economics, OR, and algorithm design, this text comprehensively covers a major inter-disciplinary field and its important applications from the basics to state of the art. Key chapters discuss efficiency, fairness and incentives, and market design and its relation to social choice theory.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Preface Foreword Alvin E. Roth Part I. Foundations of Market Design: 1. Two-sided markets: stable matching Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani 2. One-sided matching markets Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani 3. Matching markets with transfers and salaries Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani 4. Objectives Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani 5. Applications of online matching Zhiyi Huang and Thorben Trobst 6. Online matching in advertisement auctions Nikhil R. Devanur and Aranyak Mehta 7. Spectrum auctions from the perspective of matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt 8. School choice Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryam 9. Kidney exchange Itai Ashlagi 10. Normative properties for object allocation problems: characterizations and trade-offs Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus 11. Choice and market design Samson Alva and Battal Dogan 12. Combinatorics of stable matchings Tamas Fleiner 13. Algorithmics of matching markets Jiehua Chen and David Manlove 14. Generalized matching: contracts and networks John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp 15. Complementarities and externalities Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra 16. Large matching markets Jacob D. Leshno 17. Pseudomarkets Marek Pycia 18. Dynamic matching Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv 19. Matching with search frictions Hector Chade and Philipp Kircher 20. Unraveling Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer 21. Investment in matching markets Matthew Elliott and Eduard Talamas 22. Signaling in two-sided matching markets Soohyung Lee 23. Two-sided markets matching design Renato Gomez and Alessandro Pavan 24. Matching market experiments Yan Chen 25. Empirical models of non-transferable utility matching Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini 26. Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie 27. New solution concepts Shengwu Li and Irene Lo 28. Machine learning for matching markets Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath 29. Contract theory Gabriel Carroll 30. Secretaries, prophets, and applications to matching Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier 31. Exploration and persuasion Aleksandrs Slivkins 32. Fairness in prediction and allocation Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron L. Roth.
Preface Foreword Alvin E. Roth Part I. Foundations of Market Design: 1. Two-sided markets: stable matching Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani 2. One-sided matching markets Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani 3. Matching markets with transfers and salaries Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V. Vazirani 4. Objectives Federico Echenique, Nicole Immorlica and Vijay V.Vazirani 5. Applications of online matching Zhiyi Huang and Thorben Trobst 6. Online matching in advertisement auctions Nikhil R. Devanur and Aranyak Mehta 7. Spectrum auctions from the perspective of matching Paul Milgrom and Andrew Vogt 8. School choice Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Aram Grigoryam 9. Kidney exchange Itai Ashlagi 10. Normative properties for object allocation problems: characterizations and trade-offs Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus 11. Choice and market design Samson Alva and Battal Dogan 12. Combinatorics of stable matchings Tamas Fleiner 13. Algorithmics of matching markets Jiehua Chen and David Manlove 14. Generalized matching: contracts and networks John William Hatfield, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, Alexander Teytelboym and Alexander Westkamp 15. Complementarities and externalities Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra 16. Large matching markets Jacob D. Leshno 17. Pseudomarkets Marek Pycia 18. Dynamic matching Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv 19. Matching with search frictions Hector Chade and Philipp Kircher 20. Unraveling Hanna Halaburda and Guillaume Haeringer 21. Investment in matching markets Matthew Elliott and Eduard Talamas 22. Signaling in two-sided matching markets Soohyung Lee 23. Two-sided markets matching design Renato Gomez and Alessandro Pavan 24. Matching market experiments Yan Chen 25. Empirical models of non-transferable utility matching Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini 26. Structural estimation of matching markets with transferable utility Alfred Galichon and Bernard Salanie 27. New solution concepts Shengwu Li and Irene Lo 28. Machine learning for matching markets Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath 29. Contract theory Gabriel Carroll 30. Secretaries, prophets, and applications to matching Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier 31. Exploration and persuasion Aleksandrs Slivkins 32. Fairness in prediction and allocation Jamie Morgenstern and Aaron L. Roth.
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