Rules and Reason
Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy
Herausgeber: Mudambi, Ram; Sobbrio, Giuseppe; Navarra, Pietro
Rules and Reason
Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy
Herausgeber: Mudambi, Ram; Sobbrio, Giuseppe; Navarra, Pietro
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This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.
This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy and suggests possible future strategies for change.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 336
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. Juli 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 547g
- ISBN-13: 9780521659598
- ISBN-10: 0521659590
- Artikelnr.: 21927063
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 336
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. Juli 2010
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 547g
- ISBN-13: 9780521659598
- ISBN-10: 0521659590
- Artikelnr.: 21927063
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Foreword James M. Buchanan; 1. Constitutional issues in modern democracies
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 2. On writing a
constitution Dennis C. Mueller; 3. Constitutional order and economic
evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies
Viktor Vanberg; 4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and
Yong J. Yoon; 5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles
K. Rowley; 6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations
and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman; 7. Ideological competition and
institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not
nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; 8. Electoral systems and
the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings
Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; 9. Ordinary elections and
constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon; 10. The cost imposed on
political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National
Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 11. A model of
two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II
and Allen W. Wilhite; 12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or
political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and
Olga V. Shevetsova; 13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; 14. The Maastricht 'excessive
deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte; 15. Subsidiarity,
federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European
Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 2. On writing a
constitution Dennis C. Mueller; 3. Constitutional order and economic
evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies
Viktor Vanberg; 4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and
Yong J. Yoon; 5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles
K. Rowley; 6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations
and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman; 7. Ideological competition and
institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not
nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; 8. Electoral systems and
the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings
Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; 9. Ordinary elections and
constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon; 10. The cost imposed on
political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National
Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 11. A model of
two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II
and Allen W. Wilhite; 12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or
political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and
Olga V. Shevetsova; 13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; 14. The Maastricht 'excessive
deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte; 15. Subsidiarity,
federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European
Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.
Foreword James M. Buchanan; 1. Constitutional issues in modern democracies
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 2. On writing a
constitution Dennis C. Mueller; 3. Constitutional order and economic
evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies
Viktor Vanberg; 4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and
Yong J. Yoon; 5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles
K. Rowley; 6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations
and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman; 7. Ideological competition and
institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not
nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; 8. Electoral systems and
the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings
Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; 9. Ordinary elections and
constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon; 10. The cost imposed on
political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National
Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 11. A model of
two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II
and Allen W. Wilhite; 12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or
political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and
Olga V. Shevetsova; 13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; 14. The Maastricht 'excessive
deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte; 15. Subsidiarity,
federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European
Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.
Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 2. On writing a
constitution Dennis C. Mueller; 3. Constitutional order and economic
evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies
Viktor Vanberg; 4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and
Yong J. Yoon; 5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles
K. Rowley; 6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations
and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman; 7. Ideological competition and
institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not
nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger; 8. Electoral systems and
the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings
Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds; 9. Ordinary elections and
constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon; 10. The cost imposed on
political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National
Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio; 11. A model of
two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II
and Allen W. Wilhite; 12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or
political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and
Olga V. Shevetsova; 13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ
Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger; 14. The Maastricht 'excessive
deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte; 15. Subsidiarity,
federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European
Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.