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This book examines, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, a version of eliminative materialism formerly propounded by Richard Rorty. The author argues that this view about the nature and existence of minds and mental states, which treats them as proto-scientific theoretical entities, is false, and assumes too crude an understanding of our day-to-day use of mental language. The author also develops positive conclusions in the philosophy of mind from a criticism of these underlying assumptions, setting out an alternative position derived from Wittgenstein's notion of criteria.

Produktbeschreibung
This book examines, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, a version of eliminative materialism formerly propounded by Richard Rorty. The author argues that this view about the nature and existence of minds and mental states, which treats them as proto-scientific theoretical entities, is false, and assumes too crude an understanding of our day-to-day use of mental language. The author also develops positive conclusions in the philosophy of mind from a criticism of these underlying assumptions, setting out an alternative position derived from Wittgenstein's notion of criteria.
Autorenporträt
John Black taught Liberal Studies and Philosophy at Vancouver Island University until his retirement in 2017. His research interests have included the later Wittgenstein, the philosophy of mind, Platonic science and 18th-century aesthetics.