Testimonial Injustice and Trust
Herausgeber: Altanian, Melanie; Baghramian, Maria
Testimonial Injustice and Trust
Herausgeber: Altanian, Melanie; Baghramian, Maria
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This book presents novel approaches and perspectives to scholarship on epistemic injustice and particularly, testimonial injustice and their connections with public trust. It will appeal to scholars and students in critical social and political epistemology.
This book presents novel approaches and perspectives to scholarship on epistemic injustice and particularly, testimonial injustice and their connections with public trust. It will appeal to scholars and students in critical social and political epistemology.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 370
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. April 2025
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 638g
- ISBN-13: 9781032500706
- ISBN-10: 1032500700
- Artikelnr.: 73489905
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 370
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. April 2025
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 638g
- ISBN-13: 9781032500706
- ISBN-10: 1032500700
- Artikelnr.: 73489905
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Melanie Altanian is Assistant Professor at the Chair of Epistemology and Theory of Science, Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Germany. Previously, she was a guest lecturer at University College Dublin School of Philosophy, and research assistant in the Horizon 2020 project Policy, Expertise, and Trust in Action (PERITIA). Maria Baghramian is Full Professor of Philosophy at University College Dublin, Ireland and a Professor II at University of Oslo, Norway. She currently is lead investigator of the Horizon 2020 project Policy, Expertise and Trust in Action (PERITIA), which created the occasion for work on this volume.
Introduction: Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust Part I.
Rethinking Testimonial Injustice 1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be
Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the
Prospects of a Normative Clash 2. Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial
Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice. 3. Testifying Bodies:
Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization 4. Redefining the Wrong of
Epistemic Injustice: The Knower as a Concrete Other and the Affective
Dimension of Cognition 5. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for
Testimonial Injustice 6. Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is
Testimonial Injustice? Part II. Testimonial Injustice and the Question of
Trust 7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust 8. Trust, Distrust, and
Testimonial Injustice 9. Social Media, Trust and the Epistemology of
Prejudice Part III. The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice 10.
Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on
Gendered Violence 11. Representation and Epistemic Violence 12. Remembrance
and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and
Hermeneutical Injustice 13. "The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible":
How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid 14.
Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply
to Brennan Part IV. Testimonial Injustice and Public Health 15.
Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional
Testimonial Justice 16. Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine
Mistrust 17. Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy 18. Epistemology and the
Pandemic Lessons from an Epistemic Crisis
Rethinking Testimonial Injustice 1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be
Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the
Prospects of a Normative Clash 2. Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial
Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice. 3. Testifying Bodies:
Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization 4. Redefining the Wrong of
Epistemic Injustice: The Knower as a Concrete Other and the Affective
Dimension of Cognition 5. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for
Testimonial Injustice 6. Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is
Testimonial Injustice? Part II. Testimonial Injustice and the Question of
Trust 7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust 8. Trust, Distrust, and
Testimonial Injustice 9. Social Media, Trust and the Epistemology of
Prejudice Part III. The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice 10.
Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on
Gendered Violence 11. Representation and Epistemic Violence 12. Remembrance
and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and
Hermeneutical Injustice 13. "The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible":
How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid 14.
Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply
to Brennan Part IV. Testimonial Injustice and Public Health 15.
Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional
Testimonial Justice 16. Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine
Mistrust 17. Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy 18. Epistemology and the
Pandemic Lessons from an Epistemic Crisis
Introduction: Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust Part I.
Rethinking Testimonial Injustice 1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be
Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the
Prospects of a Normative Clash 2. Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial
Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice. 3. Testifying Bodies:
Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization 4. Redefining the Wrong of
Epistemic Injustice: The Knower as a Concrete Other and the Affective
Dimension of Cognition 5. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for
Testimonial Injustice 6. Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is
Testimonial Injustice? Part II. Testimonial Injustice and the Question of
Trust 7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust 8. Trust, Distrust, and
Testimonial Injustice 9. Social Media, Trust and the Epistemology of
Prejudice Part III. The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice 10.
Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on
Gendered Violence 11. Representation and Epistemic Violence 12. Remembrance
and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and
Hermeneutical Injustice 13. "The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible":
How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid 14.
Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply
to Brennan Part IV. Testimonial Injustice and Public Health 15.
Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional
Testimonial Justice 16. Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine
Mistrust 17. Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy 18. Epistemology and the
Pandemic Lessons from an Epistemic Crisis
Rethinking Testimonial Injustice 1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be
Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the
Prospects of a Normative Clash 2. Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial
Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice. 3. Testifying Bodies:
Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization 4. Redefining the Wrong of
Epistemic Injustice: The Knower as a Concrete Other and the Affective
Dimension of Cognition 5. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for
Testimonial Injustice 6. Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is
Testimonial Injustice? Part II. Testimonial Injustice and the Question of
Trust 7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust 8. Trust, Distrust, and
Testimonial Injustice 9. Social Media, Trust and the Epistemology of
Prejudice Part III. The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice 10.
Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on
Gendered Violence 11. Representation and Epistemic Violence 12. Remembrance
and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and
Hermeneutical Injustice 13. "The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible":
How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid 14.
Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply
to Brennan Part IV. Testimonial Injustice and Public Health 15.
Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional
Testimonial Justice 16. Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine
Mistrust 17. Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy 18. Epistemology and the
Pandemic Lessons from an Epistemic Crisis