This work presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100 percent reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform debate in the US.
This work presents a comprehensive history and evaluation of the role of the 100 percent reserve plan in the banking legislation of the New Deal reform era from its inception in 1933 to its re-emergence in the current financial reform debate in the US.
Ronnie J. Phillips is Professor of Economics at Colorado State University in Fort Collins and a Research Associate of The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York. He received his B.A. degree from the University of Oklahoma in 1973, and a Ph.D. in economics from The University of Texas at Austin in 1980. He previously taught at Texas A&M University in College Station and has been a visiting scholar in the Bank Research Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. His current research interests are banking regulation, financial institutions, and financial history of the United States. His articles have appeared in numerous journals including The Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, The Journal of International Economics, Southern Economic Journal, and the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction Chapter 1 A History of Currency and Banking in the United States Chapter 2 Response to the Banking Crisis: Hoover, Congress, and the Economists Chapter 3 Roosevelt's Election and the Banking Crisis of 1933 Chapter 4 The March 1933 Chicago Memorandum Chapter 5 The 100 Days Legislation and the Banking Act of 1933 Chapter 6 The November Chicago Memorandum Chapter 7 The Banking Reform Agenda: A Federal Monetary Authority and Credit Allocation Chapter 8 Currie, Eccles, and the Ideal Conditions for Monetary Control Chapter 9 100% Money: Fisher's Version of the Chicago Plan Chapter 10 The Banking Act of 1935 Chapter 11 Academic Views of the Chicago Plan Chapter 12 The Chicago Plan after the Passage of the Banking Act of 1935 Chapter 13 Financial Instability and Narrow Banking: Simons Revisited Chapter 14 Conclusion
Introduction Chapter 1 A History of Currency and Banking in the United States Chapter 2 Response to the Banking Crisis: Hoover, Congress, and the Economists Chapter 3 Roosevelt's Election and the Banking Crisis of 1933 Chapter 4 The March 1933 Chicago Memorandum Chapter 5 The 100 Days Legislation and the Banking Act of 1933 Chapter 6 The November Chicago Memorandum Chapter 7 The Banking Reform Agenda: A Federal Monetary Authority and Credit Allocation Chapter 8 Currie, Eccles, and the Ideal Conditions for Monetary Control Chapter 9 100% Money: Fisher's Version of the Chicago Plan Chapter 10 The Banking Act of 1935 Chapter 11 Academic Views of the Chicago Plan Chapter 12 The Chicago Plan after the Passage of the Banking Act of 1935 Chapter 13 Financial Instability and Narrow Banking: Simons Revisited Chapter 14 Conclusion
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