Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies.
Ganson offers new hope in this work for the defense of scientific realism by undermining powerful anti-realist objections and advocating an abandonment of naturalist and externalist strategies.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Dorit A. Ganson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Oberlin College.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction I. Explanationism I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program 2. Acausal Models of Explanation II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments II.i The Scientific Image II.ii Laws and Symmetry III. The Bayesian Peter Objection III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument III.ii Flaws in the Argument III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints II. The Principle of Reflection III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism 6. The Transcendental Road to Realism I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules Appendix I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification) II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue Works Cited Index
Preface 1. Introduction I. Explanationism I.i The Debate About Realism and the Constraints of Rationality I.ii Versions of Explanationism/Realism I.iii Externalist vs. Internalist Explanationist Approaches to Defending Realism II. Miller's Internalist Explanationism II.i Introducing Topic-Specific Truisms II.ii The Role of Truisms in the Explanationist Defense of Realism II.iii Why Truisms are Independent Marks of Rationality III.iv Unfinished Business in Miller's Program 2. Acausal Models of Explanation II.i Hume's Legacy and the Deductive-Nomological Model II.ii From the Inductive-Statistical Model to the Statistical Relevance Approach III. The Statistical Relevance Model of Explanation III.i An Outline of the Model and some Refinements III.ii The Requirement of Objective Homogeneity III.iii Salmon's Acausal Criteria for Admissible Selection Rules and Ensuing Problems III.iv Difficulties in the Identification of Causal Relevance with Statistical Relevance 3. Van Fraassen's Arguments Against Inference to the Best Explanation I. Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism II. Building a Case Against Explanationism: The Short Arguments II.i The Scientific Image II.ii Laws and Symmetry III. The Bayesian Peter Objection III.i Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument III.ii Flaws in the Argument III.iii Reconciling Explanationism with Bayes' Theorem 4. Van Fraassen's Dutch Books I. A Philosophical Application of the Probability Calculus: Using Dutch Book Arguments to Derive Rationality Constraints II. The Principle of Reflection III. The Temporally Extended Principle of Reflection IV. A Prohibition Against Assigning A Probability Value to some Special Conditional Propositions 5. Varieties of Explanationism and Fine's Critique I. Smart's Wouldn't It be a Miracle? Argument II. Boyd's Arguments for Realism II.i Boyd's Inference to the Best Explanation II.ii Rival Explanans and Explanandum II.iii The Circularity Objection and the Realist Package III. Naturalized vs. Non-naturalized Realism 6. The Transcendental Road to Realism I. Fine's Criticisms of Miller's Realism II. The True Source of Unreasonable Doubt III. Why Taking on Isn't Good Enough IV. Salvaging Realism about Molecules Appendix I. The Ralist Account of Broad Empirical Scope (and its Bayesian Justification) II. Van Fraassen's UnBayesian Rejection of Broad Scope as an Epistemically Relevant Virtue Works Cited Index
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