Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons…mehr
Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.
Matt Andrews is a fellow at the Center for International Development at Harvard's Kennedy School and the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. His numerous articles have appeared in journals such as Governance, the International Public Management Journal, the Public Administration Review, Oxford Development Studies, Public Administration and Development and the Journal of Development Studies. Prior to his fellowship at Harvard, Professor Andrews was a vice president of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management and supported various government leaders in South Africa during the transition from apartheid. He has worked in more than twenty-five developing and transitional countries as a permanent member of the World Bank and as a Harvard University academic doing research on development and government reform. Dr Andrews received his PhD from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Change rules, change governments, and develop? 2. Deconstructing the puzzling evidence of reform 3. Overlooking the change context 4. Reforms as overspecified and oversimplified solutions 5. Limited engagement, limited change 6. What you see is not what you get (expecting limits) 7. Problem-driven learning sparks institutional change 8. Finding and fitting solutions that work 9. Broad engagement, broader (and deeper) change 10. Reforming rules of the development game itself.
Preface 1. Change rules, change governments, and develop? 2. Deconstructing the puzzling evidence of reform 3. Overlooking the change context 4. Reforms as overspecified and oversimplified solutions 5. Limited engagement, limited change 6. What you see is not what you get (expecting limits) 7. Problem-driven learning sparks institutional change 8. Finding and fitting solutions that work 9. Broad engagement, broader (and deeper) change 10. Reforming rules of the development game itself.
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