Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of…mehr
Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.
Robert Scott is a nationally recognized scholar and teacher in the fields of contracts, commercial transactions and bankruptcy. He was Lewis F. Powell Jr. Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law from 1982-2003, and William L. Matheson Robert M. Morgenthau Distinguished Professor from 2001-03. In 2003 he was named an inaugural recipient of the David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professorship. He has delivered numerous papers and published extensively in law journals. He has co-authored four books on contracts and commercial transactions. Among his many articles are six that he co-authored with Prof. Charles Goetz that set the standard for the economic analysis of the law of contracts. Paul Stephan is an expert on international business and Soviet and post-Soviet legal systems who spent his career studying and writing about the globalization of the world economy and the transition away from Soviet-style socialism. He joined the Virginia faculty in 1979 and was the Percy Brown Jr. Professor of Law from 1991 to 2003. He has written extensively on international law, corruption, and the history of the Cold War, as well as on taxation and constitutional law. He has worked in Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Albania, and Slovakia on behalf of the U.S. Treasury and in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on behalf of the International Monetary Fund.
Inhaltsangabe
Foreword 1. Introduction 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law 3. Lessons from contract theory 4. A model of optimal enforcement 5. Patterns of international law enforcement 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement 7. The future of international law and its enforcement Glossary Table of authorities Index.
Foreword 1. Introduction 2. States, firms, and the enforcement of international law 3. Lessons from contract theory 4. A model of optimal enforcement 5. Patterns of international law enforcement 6. The choice between formal and informal enforcement 7. The future of international law and its enforcement Glossary Table of authorities Index.
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