Recently there has been a convergence of party funding regimes across many states of Western Europe. The driving force behind this process has been the introduction of state funding to political parties. This book subsequently asks why state funding to political parties has been introduced in ever more countries and yet there still remain some places where it has only been introduced to a decidedly limited degree? It argues that a consensus of the relevant parties is a prerequisite for the introduction of state funding, thereby assuming a nexus between particular forms of party competition and…mehr
Recently there has been a convergence of party funding regimes across many states of Western Europe. The driving force behind this process has been the introduction of state funding to political parties. This book subsequently asks why state funding to political parties has been introduced in ever more countries and yet there still remain some places where it has only been introduced to a decidedly limited degree? It argues that a consensus of the relevant parties is a prerequisite for the introduction of state funding, thereby assuming a nexus between particular forms of party competition and the outcome of party funding reforms. The author shows how the introduction of state funding is more likely to occur in countries where parties have a high number of institutional veto points at their disposal, where both policy- and office-seeking play a more important role in parties' strategic preferences than vote-seeking, and where the discourse on political corruption identifies state funding as a remedy against corrupt practices. These assumptions are confirmed for four cases: Germany, Sweden, the UK, and France. He argues that two constellations of independent variables facilitate the introduction or reform of state subsidies. On the one hand, in political systems that provide parties with a considerable number of veto points, vote-seeking generally plays a minor role in decisions about party funding. On the other hand parties can reach a consensus independently of the institutional environment and their strategic preferences by engaging in the discourse on political corruption. Decreasing levels of ideological polarisation prior to the introduction of state funding imply that causal mechanisms similar to the ones identified in the four case studies are at work in established democracies in Western Europe more generally. Thus, the book represents a first step towards a theory which explains differences and similarities in party funding regimes.
Michael Koß studied Political Science, History, and Public Law in Göttingen, Besançon, and Uppsala. He received his PhD in 2008. Alongside his PhD, he worked on two research projects funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) on the German Left Party and the regulation of personal information in comparative perspective at the universities of Sussex, Oxford, and Göttingen. Since March 2009 he has been a Lecturer at the Chair of German and European Politics and Government at the University of Potsdam working on questions of party politics and public policy. Conceptually, he is interested in comparative and neo-institutionalist research designs.
Inhaltsangabe
* List of figures and tables * List of abbreviations * 1: Introduction: State Funding to Political Parties and the Convergence of Party Funding Regimes * Part I Conceptual Framework * 2: The Comparative Analysis of Party Funding Regimes * 3: The Introduction of State Funding to Political Parties from a New Institutionalist Perspective * 4: The Relationship between Party Funding and Party Competition * Part II The Party Systems and Party Funding Regimes in Comparative Perspective * 5: The Party Systems * 6: The Party Funding Regimes * Part III Case Studies * 7: Germany: The Common Interest in Consensual Politics * 8: Sweden: The Institutionally Invoked Consensus * 9: Britain: A Growing Conflict Between Party Goals and Societal Norms With (Still) No Consequences * 10: France: When The Conflict Between Party Goals and Societal Norms Has Consequences * 11: Conclusion: The Determinants of Party Funding Regimes * References * Index
* List of figures and tables * List of abbreviations * 1: Introduction: State Funding to Political Parties and the Convergence of Party Funding Regimes * Part I Conceptual Framework * 2: The Comparative Analysis of Party Funding Regimes * 3: The Introduction of State Funding to Political Parties from a New Institutionalist Perspective * 4: The Relationship between Party Funding and Party Competition * Part II The Party Systems and Party Funding Regimes in Comparative Perspective * 5: The Party Systems * 6: The Party Funding Regimes * Part III Case Studies * 7: Germany: The Common Interest in Consensual Politics * 8: Sweden: The Institutionally Invoked Consensus * 9: Britain: A Growing Conflict Between Party Goals and Societal Norms With (Still) No Consequences * 10: France: When The Conflict Between Party Goals and Societal Norms Has Consequences * 11: Conclusion: The Determinants of Party Funding Regimes * References * Index
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