Alex Mintz, Carly Wayne

The Polythink Syndrome

U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Isis

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Alex Mintz is Director of the Institute for Policy & Strategy (IPS) and Agam Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC).Carly Wayne is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 200
• Erscheinungstermin: 20. Januar 2016
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 313g
• ISBN-13: 9780804796767
• ISBN-10: 0804796769
• Artikelnr.: 42804432

Autorenporträt

Alex Mintz is Director of the Institute for Policy & Strategy (IPS) and Agam Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC). Carly Wayne is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1The Polythink Syndrome
chapter abstract
In this chapter, we introduce the Polythink phenomenon, using the
contrasting examples of Pearl Harbor and September 11 to demonstrate the
critical effect that group dynamics can have on national security policy.
We explain how Polythink is essentially the opposite of Groupthink on a
continuum of decision making from "completely cohesive" (Groupthink) to
"completely fragmented" (Polythink). We introduce the main symptoms and
causes of Polythink and outline the organization of the book.
2Causes, Symptoms, and Consequences of Polythink
chapter abstract
In this chapter, we outline the main symptoms, causes, and consequences of
the Polythink phenomenon. We also introduce key explanations and predictors
of Polythink. We then show how analysts can assess whether Polythink or
Groupthink exists in a group. Finally, we compare the Polythink dynamic
with the Groupthink dynamic and with a dynamic we call Con-Div, the middle
point between these two extremes.
3Polythink in National Security: The 9/11 Attacks
chapter abstract
This chapter provides an in-depth review of the events leading up to the
9/11 attacks, analyzing the decision-making processes of key diplomatic and
security decision-making groups, including the CIA, the Presidential
Cabinet or advisory team, the State Department, and more, to assess the key
signs and symptoms of Polythink that were present in the decision-making
processes of these groups and ultimately contributed to the failure to
prevent this staggering attack.
4Polythink and Afghanistan War Decisions: War Initiation and Termination
chapter abstract
In this chapter, we analyze the group dynamics in the Bush and Obama
Administrations that fundamentally shaped and guided their policy decisions
regarding the entrance to and exit from the Afghanistan War. While the
initial invasion period was characterized by a deeply ingrained Groupthink
mentality that had been shaped by the traumatic and devastating September
11 attacks, the decision to withdraw from the war was fraught with internal
divisions and discordant worldviews of the national security policy-making
complex-a Polythink process that deeply inhibited the development of a
cohesive strategy for the successful conclusion of the war.
5Decision Making in the Iraq War: From Groupthink to Polythink
chapter abstract
In this chapter we continue our analysis of the detrimental effects of
flawed group decision-making processes surrounding decisions of war and
peace. Specifically, using the Iraq War as a case study, we analyze the
implications of Groupthink and Polythink on decisions made by the U.S.
government in this controversial theater. Breaking down the group dynamics
in the Bush and Obama Administrations, we demonstrate the effects of the
decision-unit group dynamic on the decisions to initiate the war, adopt the
Surge, and ultimately, withdraw from Iraq.
6Polythink in the Iranian Nuclear Dispute: Decisions of the U.S. and Israel
chapter abstract
This chapter expands the range of national security decisions that can be
affected by Polythink, examining the impact of Polythink on diplomacy,
strategy, and negotiations. Specifically, we will assess the Obama
Administration's 2009 Iran Policy Review concerning the Iranian nuclear
program, and Israel's 2012 decision not to attack Iran's nuclear
facilities. The chapter begins with the U.S. Administration's
decision-making dynamic in addressing the Iranian threat during President
Obama's first two years in office, specifically focusing on Obama's 2009
Iran Policy Review. In the second section, we analyze the decision-making
processes that occurred in the Israeli government regarding the Iranian
nuclear program in early 2012 as the government weighed a military strike
on Iran's nuclear facilities. Interestingly, we find that in the Israeli
case, the Polythink dynamic was mainly triggered by disagreement among
three sub-decision-making groups: Israeli political leaders, the Israeli
military establishment, and the U.S. Administration.
7Recent Challenges: The Syria Debate, the Renewed Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Negotiations, and the ISIS Decision
chapter abstract
This chapter provides three examples of the application of Polythink to
recent decisions and events in the international arena. Specifically, we
analyze three recent developments in the Middle East: the tragedy in Syria
and the UN and U.S. 2012 debate over sanctions against the Assad regime,
the 201314 peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians known as
the "Kerry Process," and the summer 2014 U.S. decision to attack ISIS
targets in Iraq and Syria. These three cases demonstrate the global nature
of Polythink and its relevance and applicability to U.S. and UN decisions
(i.e., with multiple players), to negotiation processes (decisions in
strategic interaction) and to tactical versus strategic decisions (as in
the ISIS decision). We discuss the deliberate decision-unit architecture of
Obama's second-term advisory team, establishing the critical importance a
leader plays in influencing whether the unit will have a Groupthink,
Con-Div, or Polythink group dynamic.
8The Global Nature of Polythink and Its Productive Potential
chapter abstract
In this chapter, we discuss the implications of Polythink, Con-Div, and
Groupthink beyond the realm of foreign policy, extending it to business
decisions, research and development (R&D) decisions, marketing and sales
decisions, production chain decisions, finance and budgeting decisions,
domestic policymaking, voluntary and not-for-profit decisions, and
small-group decisions in individuals' daily lives. We also detail
strategies for transforming Destructive Polythink into Productive
Polythink, such as engineering the decision unit to ensure a more balanced
evaluation of policy alternatives en route to "good" decisions.
Understanding these dynamics is crucial to explaining, predicting, and
improving national security and foreign policy decisions, business and
corporate decisions, and individual decisions.