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It is common for crime victims to complain about the ineffectiveness of the police station in handling their case, when it does not enter the investigative stage. Despite frequent complaints from the population, a percentage of police reports do enter the police investigation phase, that is, they move beyond the complaint stage and begin the investigative phase, as recorded in police files. So, is there a selection criterion for cases to be investigated? This research investigated the differences in the service provided to the public in police districts in São Paulo and identified a link with the Community Security Councils (CONSEGs) through a "flow" of social capital, which allows the transfer of benefits between restricted social groups. In this sense, we investigated the extent to which this "flow" enables decisions made by management councils to influence activities carried out in police districts and, likewise, the extent to which police district representatives influence the decision-making dynamics of CONSEGs.