Offers the first book-length exploration of Kierkegaard's views on knowledge, an epistemology that M.G. Piety argues is both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist, substantive and procedural, and includes both internalist and externalist theories of belief justification.
Offers the first book-length exploration of Kierkegaard's views on knowledge, an epistemology that M.G. Piety argues is both foundationalist and nonfoundationalist, substantive and procedural, and includes both internalist and externalist theories of belief justification.
M. G. Piety is Associate Professor of Applied Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Religion at Drexel University. She is the translator of Soren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Crumbs and Repetition. She lives in Philadelphia.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Acknowledgments 2. Preface 3. Sigla 4. 1. Introduction: Kierkegaard as Epistemologist 5. 2. The Knowing Subject 6. 3. Defining Knowledge 7. 4. Objective Knowledge 8. 5. Redefining Knowledge 9. 6. Subjective Knowledge 10. 7. Conclusion: The Implications of Kierkegaard's Epistemology 11. Works Cited 12. Index
