Giles Pearson

Aristotle on What Emotions Are (eBook, ePUB)

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. Even this bare formulation of his view is notable in several respects. First, the idea that the pleasures or distresses of emotions are representational--directed at objects in the world (or ourselves)--contrasts sharply with accounts that identify emotions with non-representational sensations or feelings. Second, the notion that emotions are pleasurable or distressful responses to other intentional states that apprehend their objects provides a fundamental contrast with many current accounts which instead view emotions as (in part) modes of apprehension or kinds of epistemic state themselves. Third, Aristotle's view stands in opposition to motivational accounts of emotions, insofar as while he thinks that emotions interact with desires or motivational states in important ways, he does not think they are themselves (even in part) motivational states. They are representational pleasures or distresses alone. Together, these three points give Aristotle a novel understanding of the representational role emotions play; namely, neither descriptive, nor prescriptive, but reactive. Besides developing these ideas, both textually and philosophically, the book also explores how Aristotle individuates emotion types; his understanding of the material dimension of emotions; and how his view can provide a novel explanation of recalcitrant emotions, a notoriously problematic phenomenon for many recent accounts of emotions.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: OUP eBook
• Seitenzahl: 384
• Erscheinungstermin: 31. Juli 2024
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9780198879398
• Artikelnr.: 72268523

Autorenporträt

Giles Pearson is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Bristol University. He has taught philosophy at Bristol University since 2007. Prior to that he was a lecturer at Birkbeck College, London (2006-7) and a research fellow at Christ's College, Cambridge (2003-6). His Ph.D., on Aristotle on desire, was from St. John's College, Cambridge. He has published two books; a monograph Aristotle on Desire (2012), and an edited book (co-edited with M. Pakaluk) Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (OUP, 2011). He has also published a number of articles on Aristotle in leading international peer-review journals in ancient philosophy and contributed to several prominent edited collections.

Inhaltsangabe

* Introduction : What This Book Aims to Achieve (and What It Doesn't).
A Map
* 1: Some Key Terminology and Distinctions. The Prospects for an
Analysis of Emotions in Terms of Other Intentional States
* PART I. EMOTIONS AS PLEASURES AND DISTRESSES
* 2: Emotions as Representational Hedonic States
* 3: Pleasure and Distress as Contributing to the Individuation of
Emotion Types
* 4: Emotions as Hedonic States That Are Formed in Response to
Intentional States That Apprehend Their Objects
* 5: Emotions and the Account(s) of Pleasure in the Ethics
* PART II. Emotion-Types
* 6: Anger (org¿)
* 7: Some Other (Putative) Links between Emotions and Desires
* 8: Appetite (Epithumia)
* PART III. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF EMOTIONS AND SOME PROBLEMATIC
CASES
* 9: The Material or Bodily Dimension of Emotions
* 10: Some Problematic Cases and the Supplements in the EE
Specification of the Emotions
* PART IV. FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND A SIGNIFICANT
PHILOSOPHICAL ADVANTAGE
* 11: Contrast with a Contemporary Motivational Theory. Which
Representational Role(s) Do Emotions Play?
* 12: Explaining Recalcitrant Emotions with Aristotle
* Catalogue of Aristotle's Emotions as Representational Pleasures or
Distresses