Handbook of Computational Social Choice (eBook, PDF)

Redaktion: Brandt, Felix

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Erscheinungstermin: 25. April 2016
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781316490631
• Artikelnr.: 44877930

Inhaltsangabe

Foreword Hervé Moulin; 1. Introduction to computational social choice Felix
Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang and Ariel D. Procaccia;
Part I. Voting: 2. Introduction to the theory of voting William S. Zwicker;
3. Tournament solutions Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein; 4.
Weighted tournament solutions Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry and Rolf
Niedermeier; 5. Dodgson's rule and Young's rule Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith
Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra; 6. Barriers to manipulation in
voting Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh; 7. Control and bribery in voting
Piotr Faliszewski and Jörg Rothe; 8. Rationalizations of voting rules Edith
Elkind and Arkadii Slinko; 9. Voting in combinatorial domains Jérôme Lang
and Lirong Xia; 10. Incomplete information and communication in voting
Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein; Part II. Fair Allocation: 11.
Introduction to the theory of fair allocation William Thomson; 12. Fair
allocation of indivisible goods Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre and
Nicolas Maudet; 13. Cake cutting algorithms Ariel D. Procaccia; Part III.
Coalition Formation: 14. Matching under preferences Bettina Klaus, David F.
Manlove and Francesca Rossi; 15. Hedonic games Haris Aziz and Rahul Savani;
16. Weighted voting games Georgios Chalkiadakis and Michael Wooldridge;
Part IV. Additional Topics: 17. Judgment aggregation Ulle Endriss; 18. The
axiomatic approach and the internet Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar; 19.
Knockout tournaments Virginia Vassilevska-Williams.