Étienne Brown

Moral Judgement (eBook, ePUB)

An Introduction through Anglo-American, German and French Philosophy

• Format: ePub

Produktbeschreibung

This book is the first to introduce readers to contemporary philosophical works on moral judgement stemming from France, Germany and the Anglo-American world - many of which remain untranslated. By integrating Kantian and Aristotelian reflections on this subject, the author combines historiography and critical reflection to offer a rich picture of what it means to make good moral decisions. As both Kantians and Aristotelians argue, moral judgements are ultimately grounded in the normativity of practical identities. Thus, it is by identifying the obligations tied to the multiple dimensions of our identities (e.g., friend, teacher, romantic partner, citizen) that we can ultimately understand how we ought to act. Yet, Aristotle and Kant also remind us that doing so requires the acquisition of moral virtues which allow us to better discern practical reasons in concrete situations.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Bloomsbury eBooks US
• Seitenzahl: 236
• Erscheinungstermin: 6. Oktober 2022
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781786615176
• Artikelnr.: 66028698

Autorenporträt

Étienne Brown is a Postdoctoral fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics whose research is currently supported by Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. He holds a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne and has held visiting appointments at the University of Pittsburgh and the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction: What is moral judgment?
Part I: The Aristotelian Critique of Kantian Judgment: Perspectives from France, Germany and the Anglo-American World
1. Practical Reasoning without Virtue? Moral Judgment in the Aristotelian Communitarian Tradition
2. German Neo-Aristotelianism and the Normativity of Ethos
3. French Aristotelianism and the Concept of Deliberation
Part II Rationality, Identity and Virtue: Kantian Judgment After the Aristotelian Critique
4. Discourse Ethics and the Basis of Moral Judgments
5. Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities
6. Judging without Principles: Arendt's Model of Practical Judgment
7. Kantian Deliberation and Conflicting Obligations
8. Learning Judgment: Pedagogy, Virtue and Discerning Reasons
Conclusion