Carlos Moya

Moral Responsibility (eBook, PDF)

The Ways of Scepticism

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

We are strongly inclined to believe in moral responsibility, that some human agents truly deserve moral praise or blame for some of their actions. However, recent philosophical discussion has put this natural belief in the reality of moral responsibility under suspicion. There are important reasons to think that moral responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, possibly rendering moral responsibility an impossibility.
This book lays out the major arguments for skepticism about moral responsibility and subjects them to sustained and penetrating critical analysis. "Moral Responsibility" lays out the intricate dialectic involved in these issues in a helpful and accessible way. The book goes on to suggest a way in which skepticism can be avoided, arguing that an excessive pre-eminence given to the will might lie at the root of skepticism of moral responsibility. Carlos Moya offers an alternative to skepticism, showing how a cognitive approach to moral responsibility which stresses the importance of belief would rescue our natural and centrally important faith in the reality of moral responsibility.

---

Dieser Download kann aus rechtlichen Gründen nur mit Rechnungsadresse in A, B, BG, CY, CZ, D, DK, EW, E, FIN, F, GR, HR, H, IRL, I, LT, L, LR, M, NL, PL, P, R, S, SLO, SK ausgeliefert werden.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis eBooks
• Seitenzahl: 256
• Erscheinungstermin: 27. September 2006
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781134194575
• Artikelnr.: 38460452

Autorenporträt

Carlos Moya

Inhaltsangabe

Acknowledgements. Introduction: Scepticism about Moral Responsibility (SMR)
1. Determinism and Alternative Possibilities (SMR's premises A and B) 2.
Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (SMR's premise B) 3.
Moral Responsibility and Control (SMR's premise B) 4. Indeterminism and
Moral Responsibility (SMR's premise C) 5. Overcoming Scepticism? Belief and
Moral Responsibility. Conclusion. References