Kohar begins with an introduction to the mechanistic theory of explanation, focusing on the analysis of mechanistic constitution as the basis of explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanation. He argues that any viable analysis of representational contents implies that content is not constitutively relevant to cognitive phenomena. The author also addresses objections against his argument and concludes with an examination of the consequences of his account for both traditional cognitive neuroscience and non-representationalist alternatives. This book is of interest to readers in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and neuroscience.
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