Eugénia Da Condeição-Heldt

The Common Fisheries Policy in the European Union (eBook, PDF)

A Study in Integrative and Distributive Bargaining

• Format: PDF

Produktbeschreibung

The purpose of this book is neither to duplicate overviews of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) nor to recapitulate narrative treatments of the European integration process. The aim is to comprehend how EU negotiations work theoretically and empirically so that a conceptual framework for analyzing EU international negotiations will be provided and juxtaposed to two key negotiations leading to the establishment of the CFP.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Taylor & Francis eBooks
• Seitenzahl: 146
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. März 2004
• Englisch
• ISBN-13: 9781135933128
• Artikelnr.: 43072946

Autorenporträt

Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt is Professor of International Politics at the Institut of Political Science at the University of Dresden.

Inhaltsangabe

Introduction: Analysing Negotiations in the European Union 1. Finding a
Starting-Point: The EU as a Negotiating Polity 2. Methodological Problems
when Analysing Negotiations in the EU 3. The Role of Theory in Political
Science 4. Searching for Theoretical Conceptualisations of the EU
Bargaining Game 5. The Need for a Multi-Theoretical Approach in the
Analysis of Negotiations in the EU 6. The Road to New Findings I. The
Settlement of the Common Fisheries Policy: Trying to Cope with a Changing
Environment 1. Some Basic Facts: The Four Pillars of the Common Fisheries
Policy 2. Explaining the Policy Transfer to the EU 3. The Open Access
Character of Fisheries and the Overexploitation of Resources 4. The
"Tragedy of the Commons" Applied to Fisheries 5. The State of the Art in
the Common Fisheries Policy II. Constructing a Springboard: A Conceptual
Framework for Analysing Negotiations in the EU 1. Setting the Stage 2.
Defining the Players: Council-Commission Tandem or the Complexity of
Principal-Agents Relations 3. Defining Actors' Preferences 4. The
Institutional Setting: Formal and Informal Rules 5. The Empirical Analysis:
Bargaining Games and Single-Peaked Preferences III. Actors' Preferences and
the Institutional Setting in Action: An Integrative Bargaining Game 1.
Negotiations in the EU as a Co-operative Game in Practice 2. The
Negotiations on the Settlement of the Structural Policy and of the Common
Market Organization 3. Explaining the Bargaining Outcome:
Coalition-Building and Issue Linkage IV. Actors' Preferences and the
Institutional Setting in Action: A Distributive Bargaining Game 1. The
Settlement of the Conservation and Management Policy: The Acrimonious
Negotiations on How to Divide the Fisheries Resources 2. Member States'
Negotiating Positions: Restricted or Unrestricted Application of the Equal
Access Principle 3. The Preference of the European Commission: The
Importance of Having a Quota System 4. The Negotiating Process: When
Actors' Preferences and the Institutional Setting Meet 5. Explaining the
Bargaining Outcome: Side-payments and the Shadow of the Future 6. Relaxing
the Unanimity Voting Rule in Fisheries: A Short Intermezzo on Showing
Dissatisfaction with the EU System V. Conclusion, or Drawing the Threads
Together 1. Conclusions: The Three Findings 2. Preferences of Member States
Matter 3. Preferences of the Commission Matter 4. The Institutional Setting
Matters 5. Some Generalizations about the Negotiation Process in the EU